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Former Supreme Court law clerks are familiar with the moment 
that someone learns of their experience clerking on the Court. “Real-
ly? What did you do in that job? What are the Justices like? Is it true 
that . . . ?” And so it goes—a litany of fascinated questions about the 
Justices and the working of the Court. Interestingly, the questions 
from lawyers and non-lawyers are surprisingly similar and all bes-
peak an intense curiosity about the Court and the Justices. By talk-
ing to someone who was “there,” people hope they can come to better 
understand the institution. 
 It is little wonder, then, that scholars who study the Supreme 
Court have lately focused on law clerks. In particular, two recent 
books—Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the 
Supreme Court Law Clerk (Courtiers) by Todd C. Peppers,1 and Sor-
cerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Su-
preme Court (Sorcerers) by Artemus Ward and David L. Weiden2—
describe and analyze the history and development of Supreme Court 
law clerks as an institution. Each book offers a treasure trove of in-
formation, much of it new or newly-compiled. The authors rely on 
archival material, such as the recently public papers of Justices Pow-
ell and Blackmun, as well as their own surveys of and interviews 
with former law clerks. 
 Ultimately, however, despite the authors’ diligence, even taken 
together, the books fail to adequately address what most readers re-
ally want to know: Do law clerks have inappropriate influence on the 
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 1. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) [hereinafter COURTIERS]. 
 2. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF 
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006) [hereinafter SORCERERS].
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Justices’ decisions and opinions?3 Although Peppers does not claim to 
fully answer this question,4 he nonetheless concludes that the condi-
tions for undue influence “have rarely, if ever, existed on the Su-
preme Court.”5 But this conclusion, however tenable, is unpersuasive; 
Courtiers’ analysis is superficial, especially in contrast to its extraor-
dinarily thorough historical presentation. In contrast, Ward and 
Weiden are more skeptical and raise concerns that the Justices have 
delegated their duties to an unconstitutional extent.6 But Sorcerers’
evidence does not lead inexorably to the concerns that they raise, as 
the authors themselves admit.7 So even after these two detailed in-
vestigations into the clerkship institution, the key question remains 
largely unresolved. 
 The joint appearance of these new books, however, provides an 
opportunity to consider a more fundamental question: Why is the 
question of law clerk influence so compelling in the first place? After 
all, members of Congress often do not read the bills, or even the 
committee reports for the bills, on which they vote. They rely instead 
on briefings by their (often young and inexperienced) staff or on di-
rection from their party leadership.8 Yet this reality, for the most 
part, goes unremarked. Likewise, lower court judges, like Supreme 
Court Justices, have law clerks and those law clerks do many of the 
same kinds of things—notably opinion writing—as Supreme Court 
law clerks. While there are occasional critiques of such judges’ re-
                                                                                                                    
 3. This question of whether Supreme Court law clerks have inappropriate influence is 
not new. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court? U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/ 
2008/12/09/william-rehnquist-writes-in-1957-on-supreme-court-law-clerks-influence; Henry 
S. Cohn, Book Review, 53-OCT FED. LAW. 51 (2006) (reviewing TODD C. PEPPERS,
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE COURT LAW CLERK
(2006)) (noting that the dispute over the extent to which Supreme Court law clerks “unduly 
influence the [J]ustices in the decision-making process” has “rag[ed] since the 1950s”); Da-
vid J. Garrow, Acolytes in Arms, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 411, 420 (2006) (noting the potential for 
law clerks to exert ideological influence on opinion writing and in capital cases); The Ab-
rams Report (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 28, 2004) (interview by Dan Abrams with 
David Margolick, Journalist, Vanity Fair) (“[T]here’s long been a suspicion that Justice 
Kennedy is susceptible to the influence of his law clerks.”); Tony Mauro, Blackmun Article 
Triggers Backlash, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, (discussing accusations that Blackmun’s 
papers “show an outsized influence and assertive tone by [his] clerks”). But see id. (“The 
real issue is . . . whether furnishing the [J]ustices with four clerks creates powerful incen-
tives to the [J]ustices to do less of their work than if they had only one.”) (quoting David 
Garrow). 
 4. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 2 (claiming instead to address “fundamental questions 
about the institutional rules and norms surrounding the hiring and use of law clerks”). 
 5. Id. at 206. 
 6. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 246, 248-49. 
 7. Id. at 246. 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 232-33. 
2009]              LAW CLERK PROXY WARS 103 
liance on their clerks,9 there is not widespread cynicism about who 
are the real decisionmakers. Nor is there much curiosity about what 
these law clerks do. So what is different about the Supreme Court? 
 In this Article, I argue that the particular interest in Supreme 
Court law clerks highlights concerns that have the potential to wea-
ken the Court’s legitimacy and authority and perhaps have already 
done so, at least to some extent. These concerns create a kind of fault 
line, presenting a destabilizing threat. The Court’s importance as a 
political institution, the significant discretion Justices exercise over 
which cases they hear and how they decide them, and the shroud of 
intense secrecy surrounding the Court all contribute to the fault line. 
More specifically, I argue that the fascination with and condemnation 
of the Justices’ use of law clerks are really proxy wars for two more 
important concerns. The first concern is about how the Court decides 
what cases to hear, and it arises from the black box nature of the 
Court’s certiorari (cert) process. The second concern, which is both 
more important and more difficult, stems from an unresolved tension 
between judicial independence and democratic accountability, and 
from ambivalence about the role of ideology in judging. This Article 
examines the generally unstated link between these concerns and the 
oft-posed questions about law clerk influence. 
 Part I of this Article describes and evaluates the two books with a 
special focus on the light they shed on whether law clerks exercise 
undue influence. Part II explores the two proxy wars: how the Court 
decides what cases to hear and how it decides them on the merits. 
The Article also includes suggestions for changes—and less secrecy—
in the Court’s operations, notably with respect to the cert process. It 
concludes with a plea for more candid public discussion of the role of 
ideology in Supreme Court judging. 
I.   THE BOOKS
 Although previous books about the Supreme Court have relied on 
law clerks for perspective and information about the workings of  
the Court,10 those works have not focused on the clerkship institution 
itself. This new focus is the primary contribution of both Courtiers
and Sorcerers.
 The books share some striking similarities. Notably, they parallel 
each other in charting the history and development of the institution 
                                                                                                                    
 9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 221, 285-86 (2008); Wade H. 
McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 PENN. L. REV. 777, 785-87 
(1981). 
 10. See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT 
OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO 
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); BOB WOODWARD 
& SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979). 
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of law clerks at the Supreme Court. There were no law clerks for the 
first hundred or so years of the Court.11 The first Justice to have law 
clerks, Horace Gray, imported the institution from his chambers on 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court when appointed to the United 
States Supreme Court in 1882,12 and he paid them out of his own 
pocket.13 Yet within a few years, Congress appropriated money for 
each Justice to hire a “stenographic clerk,” and by the end of the 
1880s, all of the Justices had done so.14
 As the name of the position suggests, the duties of the early law 
clerks were primarily clerical,15 although Justice Gray himself, as 
well as some other early Justices, had his law clerks help him with 
his opinions.16 Moreover, although Gray’s law clerks were all Harvard 
Law School graduates,17 many other early clerks were neither law-
yers nor law students.18 For some clerks, the position may have func-
tioned as an apprenticeship, whether formal or informal. In other 
words, the clerkships may have been seen as an educational opportu-
nity for the clerks rather than (or as well as) a source of assistance to 
the Justices.19
 Both books describe the development of the law clerk’s role after 
this initial “apprenticeship” phase largely as a linear progression—
through a series of stages—from a clerical position to today’s much 
more substantive job description.20 At the same time, however, they 
both document that from the beginning some Justices used their law 
clerks much as the Justices do today.21 In addition, both books claim 
that some of the most important changes in the clerkship institution 
over time stem not from consistently increasing workloads, which is 
                                                                                                                    
 11. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 38-43; SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 24. 
 12. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 44-45; SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 26. 
 13.  COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 45; SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 24. 
 14. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 24. 
 15. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 54-55. 
 16. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
 17. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 47, 241-42 n.22. 
 18. Id. at 24, 50. 
 19. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 109, 111. 
 20. Courtiers divides the history into three periods: (1) “law clerk as stenographer” 
(1880s through about 1919, when Congress appropriated funds for each Justice to have 
both a stenographic clerk and a law clerk), COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 38; (2) “law clerk 
as legal assistant” (1920s through the 1940s), id. at 83; and, (3) “law clerk as law firm as-
sociate” (1950s through the present, initiated by Chief Justice Earl Warren), id. at 145. 
Sorcerers identifies similar timeframes for the first phase of the institution, SORCERERS,
supra note 2, at 34, and for the beginning of the second. But Ward and Weiden then argue 
that one great transformation came in 1942—more than a decade before Peppers—when 
the number of law clerks per Justice increased from one to two. Id. at 36. Also unlike Cour-
tiers, Sorcerers divides this modern period again, dating the advent of the modern law 
clerk to the early 1970s when Congress authorized three and then four law clerks per Jus-
tice and when the cert pool was introduced. Id. at 45. 
 21. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 34-35; COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 206-12. 
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the standard account, but from more subtle changes in the operations 
and personnel of the Court itself.22
 Although the books chart similar histories, in some ways they are 
quite different. Courtiers is a deliberate and cautious history. Pep-
pers reviews the historical material with respect to each Justice who 
had a law clerk, Justice by Justice, and makes few generalizations. 
In contrast, Sorcerers is more analytical and quicker to generalize. 
The books’ relative strengths and weaknesses reflect these differenc-
es between them. 
A. Courtiers of the Marble Palace
 Courtiers offers two main arguments about the development of the 
clerkship institution. The first is that the clerkship institution can 
best be understood through the lens of principal-agent (P-A) theory.23
Peppers explains that principals—in this case, the Justices—create 
selection and monitoring strategies to prevent (or detect) shirking or 
defection by their agents, the law clerks.24 The more the Justices del-
egate substantive duties, the more extensive we should expect these 
strategies to be.25 In other words, as the clerkship institution has 
changed, so too might the Justices’ use of direct and indirect mechan-
isms of control over their law clerks.26
 This perspective provides a refreshing defense of the Justices’ use 
of law clerks. The Justices are rational actors, and as such they have 
not simply turned over authority to their young assistants simply be-
cause they have delegated responsibility. Instead, even as they dele-
gate, they find ways to ensure the loyalty and dedication of their 
clerks. Modern Justices use hiring committees, current law clerk 
 interviews, or feeder judges to help them hire law clerks with  
compatible ideological goals.27 Once hired, law clerks train each oth-
                                                                                                                    
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 38-42 (discussing COURTIERS); infra text ac-
companying notes 56-76 (discussing SORCERERS). 
 23. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
 24. Id. at 12.  
 25. Id. at 14. 
 26. Peppers may overstate the relevance of principal-agent theory on occasion. Setting 
forth the theory at the very beginning of the book, he explains that one of the problems a 
principal has when hiring an agent is that the agent knows more about his own skills and 
abilities than does the principal. Id. at 11. In the context of the hiring of law clerks, I am 
not at all certain that this is true. Law clerks may well know whether, for example, they 
are good writers, but the Justices, through experience, know much more about what sort of 
people they work well with, what sort of law clerks they want to have, and what the actual 
job entails. 
 27. Id. at 31-36. Sorcerers echoes this view, arguing that “ideology largely determines 
which [appellate court] judges place their clerks with particular [J]ustices.” SORCERERS,
supra note 2, at 83. Moreover, Sorcerers concludes that in general the Justices do not 
overtly discuss ideology or politics with clerk applicants, so the use of feeder judges may be 
one of their better sources of information about clerk ideology. Id. at 102-03. See also Todd 
C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: 
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er,28 monitor each other,29 and review each other’s work.30 The Justic-
es also rely on their personal relationships with their law clerks. 
Many Justices cultivate intense bonds of affection and loyalty.31 And 
the law clerks rarely work on such significant matters as opinions 
without detailed instructions from their bosses.32 In the end, Peppers 
concludes that, in large part as a result of these mechanisms, there is 
no evidence that law clerks wield inappropriate influence over the 
decisionmaking and workings of the Court.33
 Most of the book, however, is not so analytical. As a result, it does 
not deliver the necessary support for Peppers’ conclusions. The early 
chapter on the beginning of the clerkship institution, for example, 
chronicles a wide range of Justice-law clerk relationships—from the 
substantive delegation of Justices Gray, Holmes, and Brandeis to 
more purely stenographic assignments.34 Yet the chapter says vir-
tually nothing explicit about either P-A theory or about the develop-
ment of the clerkship institution more generally.35 Likewise, many of 
the stories Peppers tells are entertaining or interesting, but they do 
not add to our understanding of what law clerks do, how Justices use 
them, or why and how the institution changed over time.36 Rather, 
Courtiers is largely descriptive, a comprehensive compendium of in-
                                                                                                                    
An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 65 (2008) (finding through statistical 
analysis that “the ideological profile of the Justice” is the most significant predictor of the 
ideological make-up of the Justice’s law clerks). 
 28. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 66. 
 29. Id. at 210.  
 30. Id.
 31. See, e.g., id. at 98 (explaining that Cardozo’s law clerks provided “ever-available 
companionship and reverential friendship” and often described him as saintly) (quoting Jo-
seph L. Rauh, Jr. et al., A Personal View of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: Recollections of 
Four Cardozo Law Clerks, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 5, 6 nn. 1, 7, 11 (1979)). 
 32. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 140-42, 158-65.  
 33. Id. at 206. 
 34. Id. at 43-70.   
 35. Id. at 38-70. 
 36. Early in the book, for example, Peppers tells the story of three young men, often 
called “The Inseparables,” who all came from Vineland, New Jersey, and worked in Wash-
ington in the early twentieth century. Clarence Melville York clerked for a Supreme Court 
Justice; Benjamin F. Barnes served as assistant secretary to President Theodore Roose-
velt. The third, John W. Crawford, was secretary to an admiral. The three men were pro-
filed in the Washington Post, which described the “deep admiration and wonder” with 
which they were regarded by the “simple folk of the quiet New Jersey hamlet” of Vineland. 
Id. at 49. Two of the young men died within two years after this article appeared. Crawford 
committed suicide, and York either jumped or fell to his death from a second-story hospital 
window. Id. at 49-50. This story is fascinating for its own sake, and it adds texture and 
human interest. But Peppers makes no attempt to link it to his promised narrative or 
analysis—or to explain why he does not. 
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formation about the Justices in relation to their law clerks; it is im-
pressive in its detail, but hard to digest.37
 Peppers’ second major argument is that the significant changes in 
ways that the Justices use their law clerks should be attributed not 
to increasing workloads, but rather to changes in institutional 
norms.38 For example, he pegs the last significant shift in the law 
clerk role—to its current incarnation as “law firm associate,” in 
which law clerks take on such substantive duties as drafting opi-
nions—to the appointment of Chief Justice Warren.39 Warren, who as 
former governor of California was used to working on substantive 
matters with a large staff, delegated increasingly substantive work to 
his law clerks.40 As a result, Peppers argues, institutional norms 
shifted and Justices appointed after Warren followed suit.41 In fact, 
he argues that increasing workload cannot explain the change in the 
law clerk’s role; if workload alone were to blame, he says, then those 
Justices already serving on the Court would have made the same 
change, and they did not.42
 This analysis is oversimplified. Although Earl Warren’s leadership 
and example undoubtedly played an important role in the develop-
ment of the law clerk institution, Peppers’ analysis leaves unans-
wered the questions of what caused Warren to precipitate this shift 
in norms, and why other Justices followed suit. Explanations consis-
tent with the workload hypothesis are possible. Those Justices al-
ready on the Court might have been comfortable enough in their jobs 
that they were able to handle a heavy and increasing workload more 
easily and efficiently than were those Justices lower down on the 
learning curve. Or the quality of their work (or life) might have suf-
fered with the increased workload, but they were unwilling to make 
significant changes in the way they did their jobs. 
 In fact, this question of why at various times in the institution 
there were changes in the Court-wide norms regarding uses of law 
clerks repeatedly goes unanswered in Courtiers, especially because 
the institutional history that Peppers describes, with the role of the 
law clerk moving from stenographer to legal assistant to law firm as-
sociate, is to some degree belied by the history he reports. His analy-
sis leaves open the question of why certain uses of law clerks became 
the institutional norm rather than remaining exceptions and why 
                                                                                                                    
 37. A few editorial changes would have helped. For example, each chapter is subdi-
vided by Chief Justice. Subheadings by Justice, with dates of service, would have made it 
much more readable. 
 38. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 145. 
 39. Id. at 151-52.  
 40. Id.
 41. Id. at 152. 
 42. Id.
108 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:101 
those shifts happened when they did. More concretely, for example, 
Justice Gray, the first to have law clerks, used them much as today’s 
Justices do. And Gray was not the only Justice of the early eras to 
use law clerks in a relatively modern way. Justices Harlan,43
Holmes,44 Brandeis,45 Reed,46 Frankfurter,47 and Cardozo48 did as 
well. These Justices were unafraid to delegate quite substantive 
work—including opinion drafting—to their law clerks. Yet Courtiers
does not explain why the example of these impressive men did not in-
fluence their colleagues to use their clerks similarly. 
 Likewise, a more nuanced analysis of the institutional norms sur-
rounding law clerks might compare these early Justices to later ones, 
taking into account changes in the Court’s workload and challenges 
to the Justices’ abilities to control their clerks. The early Justices 
who delegated significant work to their clerks are, in general, among 
the most admired and most influential in the Court’s history. Cer-
tainly no one worries that the great Justice Holmes was unduly in-
fluenced by his law clerks. Even Justice Gray, while not as well 
known today as Oliver Wendell Holmes, was seen by those who knew 
him as “a classic demi-god walking on the earth.”49 And the accounts 
of these early Justices’ interactions with their law clerks suggest that 
they never lost control of the substance of their work. Justice Gray, 
for example, would go over his law clerks’ opinion drafts line by line, 
questioning everything about them.50 The interesting question, then, 
is whether other Justices, with perhaps less intellectual prowess and 
self-confidence and—over time—with perhaps more work to do, have 
been (or will be) able to exert sufficient control.51
 Peppers’ reliance on P-A theory does not answer that question. In 
his telling, everything devolves to P-A theory, from Douglas’s re-
ported terrorizing of many of his law clerks to Warren’s treatment of 
his law clerks as if they were beloved members of his family.52 If eve-
rything about the Justice-law clerk relationship can be described as 
the effort of a principal to control his agent, then the P-A theory ex-
                                                                                                                    
 43. Id. at 54. 
 44. Id. at 57-58. 
 45. Id., at 62-66. 
 46. Id. at 98-102. 
 47. Id. at 104, 108. 
 48. Id. at 95-98. 
 49. Id. at 43. 
 50. Id. at 45. 
 51. In fact, workloads have not consistently increased over time. At the beginning of 
the 1890 Term, there were over 1800 cases pending and it took three years for a case to be 
heard. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 60, 257 (1928). On the other hand, such a high 
caseload at exactly the time that Congress provided funds for each Justice to hire a clerk 
suggests that the workload hypothesis has at least some explanatory power. 
 52. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 116-18, 151. 
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plains very little. Peppers does not even explicitly address whether 
the Justices’ control and monitoring strategies have changed along 
with the law clerk institution (although he says at the beginning that 
we should expect them to),53 nor does he evaluate the effectiveness of 
those strategies. Peppers’ conclusion that “[t]he necessary conditions 
for the exercise of influence by law clerks have rarely, if ever, existed 
on the Supreme Court”54 does not, therefore, fully persuade. 
Courtiers collects a wealth of information that historians, political 
scientists, and legal academics will be mining for years to come. In 
this respect, its contribution is significant. But Peppers’ evident re-
search prowess and persistence eclipses both his analysis and his 
book’s description of the Court as an institution—much less law 
clerks as an institution.55
B. Sorcerers’ Apprentices 
 In contrast to Peppers, Ward and Weiden take a much more ana-
lytical and conceptual approach in Sorcerers. Sorcerers is organized 
not historically, but functionally, with chapters on selecting law 
clerks, the cert process, deciding cases, and opinion writing.56 The 
book generally focuses more on the workings of the Court as an insti-
tution than does Courtiers. Indeed, Sorcerers’ most valuable contribu-
tion is its identification and analysis of a series of institutional 
changes that transformed the role of law clerks. Ward and Weiden 
argue, for example, that law clerks’ increased involvement in review-
ing cert petitions stems not from the creation of the cert pool in the 
early 1970s, but rather from Chief Justice Hughes’ decision in 1935 
to end the practice of discussing every petition in the Justices’ weekly 
conference.57 Hughes created a “dead list” of petitions that would not 
be discussed absent another Justice’s request.58 The other Justices 
therefore began to review the petitions on the dead list to ensure that 
they agreed with Hughes’ assessment.59 And they often turned to 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Id. at 16.  
 54. Id. at 206. 
 55. This criticism may seem somewhat unfair. After all, Peppers has done us a service 
by compiling a vast array of information about law clerks in one place. One reader, for ex-
ample, praised Courtiers’ textured and nuanced view of the variety of relationships that 
different Justices have with their law clerks. See OrinKerr.com, Courtiers of the Marble 
Palace: The Rise and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk, http://www.orinkerr.com 
(May 30, 2006, 11:20 EST). The problem is not so much that Peppers has gathered dispa-
rate information from numerous sources, and that those sources, not surprisingly, do not 
all neatly fit together, but rather that he promises an analytical thread and a narrative arc 
that he does not quite deliver. 
 56. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 52-53. 
 57. Id. at 37, 113. 
 58. Id. at 37.  
 59. Id.
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their law clerks for help in this process.60 As a result, the “dead list 
had the practical effect of elevating the importance of clerks in 
screening petitions for possible conference discussion.”61
Sorcerers likewise argues that law clerks became increasingly in-
volved with writing opinions due to two institutional changes, neither 
of which is obviously related to law clerk opinion writing at all. First, 
Chief Justices Vinson and Warren began assigning an equal number 
of opinions to each Justice.62 Before that, opinions were distributed 
on the basis of how many opinions each Justice had yet to issue.63
Under this old system, Justices who wrote quickly ended up writing 
more majority opinions than did those who wrote more slowly.64 Un-
der the new policy, however, slower writers like Justices Reed and 
Frankfurter had to write more opinions than they had before.65 They 
turned to their law clerks for help.66
 The second change was the creation of the cert pool in 1972.67 The 
cert pool, which was proposed by Justice Powell and continues today, 
divides cert petitions equally between the chambers of participating 
Justices.68 Within those chambers, each petition is assigned to one 
law clerk who writes a memo evaluating the petition.69 The memo is 
circulated to all of the Justices who participate in the cert pool.70 The 
pool—and the contemporaneous increase in the number of law clerks 
per Justice to three and then to four—freed up law clerks’ time pre-
viously spent reviewing cert petitions and allowed them to spend 
more time on opinions.71
 A third important institutional change that Sorcerers identifies—
although it does not tie the change directly to opinion writing—is the 
opening of the Supreme Court building in 1935.72 Before that, the 
Justices heard arguments in a room in the Capitol and did the rest of 
their work in their own homes, which is also where their law clerks 
worked (and sometimes lived).73 Moving into the building precipi-
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tated the rise of what Sorcerers calls the “clerk network.”74 The clerk 
network gives the Justices a back channel for communicating with or 
gathering intelligence about each other, and many Justices take full 
advantage of this opportunity.75 During one key abortion case, for ex-
ample, Justice Blackmun’s law clerk reported to him how Justice 
Stevens’ thinking and likely separate opinion were evolving based on 
information the law clerk obtained from Justice Stevens’ clerk.76 And 
although Sorcerers does not quite spell out the implications of the 
clerk network, to do this work effectively the law clerks must be tho-
roughly familiar with their own Justices’ thinking about the cases on 
which they are working. The clerk network, then, requires that the 
law clerks have a substantive role. 
 Whether because of or in spite of their emphasis on institutional 
factors rather than on the contours and details of the relationships 
between individual Justices and their law clerks, Ward and Weiden 
are less sanguine than Peppers about the level of influence held by 
the law clerks. With the explosion of cert petitions and the advent of 
bench memos in 1942, they say, “the clerk was transformed from be-
ing primarily a research assistant to being an active decision mak-
er.”77 And that was before most Justices delegated responsibility for 
writing opinions to their law clerks. At the end of their book, Ward 
and Weiden express a concern (although not quite a conclusion) that 
law clerks have too much influence, that Justices are not doing 
enough of their own work, “that some aspects of the role of the mod-
ern law clerk tread perilously close to what many critics see as an 
unconstitutional abdication of the [J]ustices’ duties,” and that as a 
result, the authority of the court is likely to suffer.78  
 Ward and Weiden may have articulated a concern rather than 
reached a strong conclusion of inappropriate influence in part be-
cause their book documents a fair amount of evidence pointing in the 
other direction. As law clerks began to take on more responsibility, 
the days of career clerks—clerks who serve for an extended period of 
time—ended. The last clerks to serve five or more terms were in the 
1940s.79 There are undoubtedly a number of explanations for this 
phenomenon, but one of its effects is to diminish both the institu-
tional power of law clerks in general and the influence of the individ-
ual law clerks—as does the modern practice of hiring recent law 
school graduates instead of more experienced attorneys.80 Ward and 
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Weiden’s own survey responses indicate that only three percent of 
their respondents believed that they had ever changed their Justices’ 
minds with respect to the outcome of a case.81 And Sorcerers goes on 
to document that law clerks believe that their influence is of very mi-
nor value when compared to other factors such as the Justices’ juri-
sprudential philosophy, the facts of the case, and relevant 
precedent.82 In fact, the only thing that the law clerks thought was 
less important to the Justices than their own views was the Justices’ 
awareness of public sentiment.83
 More problematic for Ward and Weiden’s concerns, however, is 
that they conflate a variety of forms of influence.84 They do not make 
normative or qualitative distinctions between some Justices’ desire 
on the one hand to have their law clerks speak their minds, to chal-
lenge their thinking, and to ensure that the Justice considers all re-
levant facts and legal arguments with, on the other hand, the occa-
sional law clerk’s efforts to be a “mission-inspired crusader”85 who 
successfully manipulates her Justice to reach results or write opi-
nions that the Justice would not reach on his own. Not all forms of in-
fluence are bad or inappropriate, but Ward and Weiden do not ac-
knowledge or address that reality.
Sorcerers’ failure to make such distinctions also renders proble-
matic its discussion of law clerks’ ideological influence. Ward and 
Weiden note that historically there was “remarkable ideological con-
gruence” between clerks and their Justices.86 They also conclude that 
there is less today than previously because today’s clerkship appli-
cants apply to all Justices, not just to those with whom they agree.87
As a result, they conclude, the clerks who are “more closely aligned 
ideologically with their [J]ustice, hav[e] more influence than oth-
ers.”88 This argument exposes the slipperiness of the idea of “influ-
ence,” and more particularly inappropriate influence. If a law clerk 
generally sees eye-to-eye with a Justice, how would one even assess 
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whether the law clerk influenced the Justice in any particular case?89
Perhaps they agreed with each other from the start.90 That Ward and 
Weiden rely on former law clerks’ self-reports of the amount of influ-
ence they had on their Justices only exacerbates the problem. Law 
clerks who agree with the opinions they worked on are more likely to 
believe they influenced them than are the less well-aligned law 
clerks, even if the actual level of influence between the two groups is 
the same. Moreover, Ward and Weiden offer plenty of examples of 
Justices disregarding their law clerks’ advice.91
 As the example of ideological influence shows, Sorcerers is at its 
weakest when it reaches broad conclusions from rather limited data. 
Ward and Weiden again overstate their case when they say “it is not 
uncommon for some clerks to continue to aid their Justice in deciding 
cases even after they leave their clerkship.”92 Their evidence for this 
assertion is that some former law clerks give their Justices feedback 
about opinions that have already issued93—which is, of course, not 
the same thing as helping to decide cases. Their closest example is 
when former law clerks—or in one case a future law clerk who had 
not yet started—send law review articles that may be relevant to 
pending cases.94 In the case of the future law clerk, however, despite 
Justice Powell’s gracious reply, there is no evidence that he read or 
relied on the note or that it affected his analysis in any way.95 Moreo-
ver, their primary examples of such communications come from the 
papers of a single Justice–Justice Powell—making any Court-wide 
generalizations suspect.96
 Not only do Ward and Weiden over-generalize from the papers of a 
handful of Justices, relying most heavily on Justice Powell and Jus-
tice Blackmun’s papers, but they also present a study of a single sig-
nificant case as a way to illustrate “the growing influence of clerks, 
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particularly in important cases.”97 The case that Sorcerers focuses on 
is Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,98 the 
landmark case that many predicted would overrule Roe v. Wade,99
but due to the unprecedented joint opinion of Justices Souter, Ken-
nedy, and O’Connor, stopped short of doing so. The story that Sorcer-
ers tells here is fascinating. Relying on Justice Blackmun’s papers, 
the authors meticulously document how Blackmun’s clerks “constant-
ly lobbied their [J]ustice, provided strategic and political analysis as 
well as legal analysis, worked tirelessly behind the scenes with clerks 
from other chambers to gain information about what was happening 
with the other [J]ustices, and drafted Blackmun’s opinion in the 
case.”100
Casey was particularly ideologically fraught and of enormous per-
sonal concern to Justice Blackmun.101 Reviled by some and embraced 
by others, as the author of Roe, he was personally identified with the 
Court’s holding that a woman’s right to control her body is a funda-
mental right of constitutional magnitude. Blackmun understood this 
to be a serious responsibility. He read all of the hate mail, but he also 
wanted to defend his work.102 The barrage of memos from Justice 
Blackmun’s law clerks shows their dedication, their loyalty to him, 
and their outrage at some of the other Justices; one law clerk even 
goes so far as to refer to Justice Scalia as “the evil nino.”103 But de-
spite Ward and Weiden’s assertion that “as . . . the case study on 
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case, by wry and disrespectful humor in chambers. I do not claim that this explanation is 
in fact what happened in Justice Blackmun’s chambers. My claim is only that it is an en-
tirely plausible explanation and one that challenges the image of the law clerk as ideologi-
cal zealot. 
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abortion demonstrates, there is no doubt that particular clerks have 
played important decision-making roles at particular times and in 
particular cases,”104 nothing in the story suggests that these law 
clerks acted as anything other than faithful surrogates, nor that they 
were delegated inappropriate authority. Blackmun might not have 
written the first draft of his opinion, but he was in constant commu-
nication with the law clerk who did.105 And even if there were inap-
propriate delegation or usurpation in Casey, generalizing from Casey
to other cases—even other landmark cases—is at best unreliable, as 
is generalizing from Justice Blackmun’s relationships with his law 
clerks to the institution as a whole.106
 The major flaw of Sorcerers is, thus, precisely the opposite of 
Courtiers. At times, the authors draw grand inferences from rather 
flimsy evidence, and they sometimes elide the differences in the insti-
tution over time or between Justices.107 On the other hand, Sorcerers
is ambitious in its analysis. It provides a much more convincing ex-
planation for the overall development of the institution than does 
Courtiers, and it is both readable and entertaining. The Casey case 
study alone is worth the price of admission for court-watchers, but 
the book’s conclusions and recommendations must be read with a 
critical eye. 
II.   THE PROXY WARS
 The twin appearance of Sorcerers and Courtiers offers more than 
the information and analysis that the books explicitly present: it 
raises a question so obvious it is rarely asked. Why is there so much 
interest in Supreme Court law clerks anyway, particularly when 
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compared to the level of interest in other influential aides to powerful 
governmental figures or even to the law clerks of other federal 
judges? The two books, as well as the rest of the literature on Su-
preme Court law clerks, focus heavily on the issues of whether law 
clerks have too much power both through their involvement with the 
cert process and through their ideological influence. As I have al-
ready discussed, these questions are not new.108 I will argue in this 
section that these debates are largely proxy wars for what people re-
ally care about—how the Court decides what cases to hear and what 
role ideology plays in the Supreme Court’s work. Although talking 
about law clerks is not the best way to address those concerns, the 
Court’s intense secrecy displaces legitimate questions about the 
Court’s operations onto the slightly more accessible concerns about 
law clerks.109
A. The First Proxy War: The Cert Review Process 
 In recent years, the number of cases decided on the merits in the 
Supreme Court has declined to historically low levels. In October 
Term 2007, for example, the Court issued only sixty-seven merits 
opinions after argument and decided only four additional cases—two 
affirmed by an equally divided court and two summary affir-
mances.110 In contrast, from 1971 to 1988, the Court handled ap-
proximately 150 merits cases a year.111 This dramatic decline has 
prompted criticism by litigators,112 academics,113 and appellate 
judges.114 The cert pool is often blamed for this caseload decline,115 in-
cluding by the authors of Sorcerers and, according to them, by Justice 
Stevens.116
 One of the key features of the cert pool and the focus of much of 
the criticism of it is that it delegates much of the cert process to law 
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clerks. But, as both Courtiers and Sorcerers demonstrate, law clerks 
have long played an integral role in reviewing cert petitions and re-
commending their disposition.117 Law clerk involvement in the cert 
process, therefore, cannot alone explain the caseload decline. 
 Charting the history of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction and law 
clerks’ role in the cert process is clarifying. Until 1925, most cases 
came to the Supreme Court as of right,118 so there was no need for the 
Court to review large numbers of cert petitions. The Judges’ Bill of 
1925 dramatically increased the Court’s control over its docket by 
significantly expanding its certiorari jurisdiction and reducing its 
mandatory jurisdiction.119 In the years following passage of the 
Judges’ Bill, cert review was largely centralized in the Chief Justice’s 
chambers, but nonetheless involved law clerks.120 Chief Justice 
Hughes, who began serving in 1930, had his law clerks review the pe-
titions and draft memos with their recommendations.121 Although 
these memos were not circulated to the other Justices, the Chief Jus-
tice used them to summarize the cert petitions at the Justices’ weekly 
conference.122 All of the Justices, therefore, were to some degree re-
liant on the work of the Chief Justice’s law clerks.  
 Over time, different Chief Justices made adjustments to this prac-
tice that, whether intentionally or not, increased law clerk involve-
ment in reviewing those cert petitions. In 1935, Chief Justice Hughes 
ended the practice of discussing every petition in conference.123 As de-
scribed above, he began to circulate a “dead list” of the cases that 
would not be discussed unless some other Justice requested it.124 As  
a result, the other Justices, often relying on their law clerks, re-
viewed the petitions on the dead list to ensure that they agreed with 
Hughes’ assessment.125
 In addition, beginning with Chief Justice Hughes and lasting until 
1971, the unpaid in forma pauperis (IFP) petitions—generally filed 
by criminal defendants and prisoners and viewed as less likely to be 
meritorious126—were handled exclusively by the Chief Justice’s law 
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clerks, who would draft a memo for each such petition.127 Although 
during Hughes’ tenure only the Chief Justice reviewed these memos, 
“subsequent Chief Justices circulated [them] to all the chambers for 
review,”128 where they were often reviewed by other  
Justices’ law clerks.129 As Sorcerers puts it, “[w]hen viewed through 
the lens of the IFP process, the creation of the cert pool was not too 
difficult a leap for the [J]ustices who joined.”130
  As cert caseloads grew still larger over time, the Court’s practice 
changed again. Today—and beginning with Chief Justice Vinson in 
1950—the Chief Justice circulates a “discuss list” rather than a “dead 
list.”131 Only those cases on the list are discussed at conference, and 
any Justice may add a case to the list.132 The vast majority of cert pe-
titions, of course, are not listed and are automatically denied.133 Sor-
cerers explains, “[a]s dockets grew, and a greater number of cases 
failed to make the discuss list, the [J]ustices were forced to rely more 
heavily on their clerks,” often asking their law clerks to write memos 
on at least some of the cert petitions.134
 Finally, in 1972, following complaints by several Justices about 
the amount of time they or their law clerks spent reviewing cert peti-
tions, the cert pool was born.135 Despite the long history of law clerk 
involvement in the cert process, much criticism of the cert pool accus-
es the Justices of having abdicated their role of reviewing the cert pe-
titions themselves.136 Ward and Weiden themselves argue that as an 
institutional matter, law clerks have largely supplanted Justices in 
making the certiorari decisions: 
It has become increasingly difficult for the [J]ustices to be a check 
against clerk-written memos. Indeed, the clerks themselves have a 
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difficult enough time checking the pool memos they receive from 
other chambers, relying on cues and shortcuts in an attempt to fil-
ter out shoddy work and biases. The cert pool has blurred the di-
viding line between [J]ustice and clerk in the long-standing battle 
against rising dockets.137
 This argument, however, casts the blame in the wrong place. The 
cert pool itself does not discourage the Justices from doing more of 
the cert work themselves. Rather, it is the sheer number of petitions. 
In OT 2006, more than 8800 cases were filed with the Court, almost 
all in the form of cert petitions.138 In OT 2007, the number dropped 
slightly to 8241 cases.139 Even Justice Stevens, who is not in the pool, 
relies on his own law clerks’ review, without reviewing the underly-
ing papers himself, in about seventy-five percent of the cases.140 Jus-
tice Brennan, who famously reviewed cert petitions himself, retired 
when the Court acted on approximately 5400 petitions a year141—
substantially less than the current cert petition caseload—and even 
Brennan delegated cert review to his law clerks during the sum-
mers.142 While it may be possible, it is neither realistic nor desirable 
for each Justice to personally review 8500 petitions a year, at least 
not without severely impairing his or her ability to engage fully in 
the other work of the Court. Assuming fifty weeks of work per year 
and a five-day workweek, 8500 petitions a year comes to 170 peti-
tions a week, or thirty-four a day.143 As the history described above 
demonstrates, even when cert caseloads were substantially lower, the 
Justices have never done all of the cert work themselves. 
 Nor can the mere existence of the cert pool (as opposed to aspects 
of the pool’s culture or the cert criteria themselves) be blamed for the 
increasingly small numbers of cases heard by the Court, as suggested 
by Ward and Weiden.144 As a matter of sheer numbers, this argument 
does not hold up. The shrinking of the Court’s merits docket did not 
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occur until more than fifteen years after the cert pool was created—
not until after Congress eliminated most of the Supreme Court’s re-
maining mandatory jurisdiction in 1988.145 Even in 1990, two years 
after this congressional action, the Court heard argument in 125 cas-
es.146
 The critics, including the authors of Sorcerers, also seem to as-
sume that there are cases that should be granted, based on some set 
of objective criteria, but that are not. At one point, for example, Sor-
cerers concludes that Blackmun’s request for background information 
about the different pool authors “would not be necessary if each pool 
clerk provided objective analyses.”147 Yet, there is no right to certiora-
ri review. Even if the law clerks make bad recommendations, which 
the Justices then follow, no party would improperly be denied their 
day in court because no one is entitled to review. In that sense, there-
fore, there is no such thing as “objective analysis,” and there are no 
cases that should be granted.148 All cert decisions are entirely discre-
tionary. The better question, therefore, is whether the law clerks rec-
ommend denials of certiorari, and whether those recommendations 
are followed in cases in which the Justices would vote differently if 
they had reviewed the petitions themselves.149
                                                                                                                    
 145. See Shapiro, supra note 113, at 277. 
 146. 2009 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 141, at Table 321. 
 147. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 137 (emphasis added). In fact, if anything, the evi-
dence suggests that the cert pool and the risk aversion that it breeds causes law clerks to 
rely too heavily on objective criteria like circuit splits. Stras, supra note 115, at 975-76. 
 148. See PERRY, supra note 10, at 221 (noting that calling a case certworthy is tauto-
logical, as it simply means that four Justices voted to grant cert); see also id. at 264 (criti-
cizing the proposal for a National Court of Appeals as failing to take into account the sub-
jective evaluations the Justices make in determining whether to grant cert). There are, of 
course, criteria for the granting of cert. Those criteria, listed in Supreme Court Rule 10, in-
clude the presence of a circuit split and an issue of national importance. A law clerk can of-
ten provide relatively neutral or objective analysis of some of those criteria—the presence 
of a clean circuit split, for example. But the relative importance of the issue or the serious-
ness of the circuit split are not matters that have an objective answer. 
 149. This is a different question from whether the criteria used by the law clerks and 
the Justices are the right criteria. I have argued elsewhere that those criteria are too nar-
row. Shapiro, supra note 113, at 284-86. An interesting proposal recently floated by a 
group of academics would largely remove the power to grant or deny cert from the Justices 
altogether. The proposed Judiciary Act of 2009 would create a Certiorari Division of all se-
nior circuit judges and federal appellate judges who have sat for at least eight years but 
are not currently serving as chief judge of their circuits. The Certiorari Division would sit 
in randomly assigned, rotating panels of five, and would grant or deny petitions for certi-
orari. The Supreme Court could overrule their decisions, choosing to grant a denied peti-
tion or choosing—but only by majority vote and with a written explanation—to deny a 
granted petition. Among the more interesting features of this proposal, it would require 
the Certiorari Division to grant a minimum of eighty and a maximum of one hundred peti-
tions per year, and it would allow the Supreme Court, by rule, to increase the maximum. 
See Posting of David Stras to Balkanization, More on Reforming the Supreme Court, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/02/more-on-reforming-supreme-court.html (Feb. 14, 2009, 
10:17 PM); see also Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in 
Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 630-35 
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 It is of course impossible to determine the answer to such a coun-
terfactual inquiry. But by breaking down the different types of plaus-
ibly certworthy cases that the Court considers and by examining the 
available empirical evidence, we can make some educated guesses. 
Some cases are heard by the Supreme Court—or (arguably) should 
be—because of their importance or the national significance of the is-
sues they present. In general, these are cases, like Clinton v. Jones,150
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,151 the right-to-die cases,152 or the Michigan af-
firmative action cases (Grutter v. Bollinger 153 and Gratz v. Bollin-
ger154), that everyone sees coming. They are sui generis, and they are 
famous before the cert petition is ever filed.155 Because of the special 
nature of these cases, a pool author’s recommendation and analysis is 
likely of relatively little importance. Analysis in the pool memo that 
the Court should deny a nationally significant case for technical rea-
sons, such as a lack of jurisdiction or waiver, is likely to be carefully 
vetted in most if not all chambers. Suggestions that the Court should 
deny for political or prudential reasons will be considered but by 
their very nature are the sorts of suggestions receiving the least defe-
rence from the Justices.156
 Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that in general the 
Justices behave differently with respect to their cert votes on high-
profile, politically salient cases than they do with respect to lower-
profile cases and likewise suggests that the differences in behavior 
vary with the ideological orientation of the Justice.157 Different beha-
vior with respect to these different cases and different behavior be-
tween Justices suggest that the Justices know that there is some-
                                                                                                                    
(2009). Interestingly, similar proposals were made during the period when the Court was 
hearing 150 cases a year. Then, the idea was that a National Court of Appeals could alle-
viate some of the Justices’ workload, not add to it. Id. at 634, n. 264.
 150. 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 151. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 152. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 
(1997).  
 153. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 154. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 155. See PERRY, supra note 10, at 253-54 (noting that there are some cases of legal im-
portance, if not social importance, that might also fall into this category). 
 156. See SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 128 (“In landmark or controversial cases, the 
[J]ustices are unlikely to rely upon the clerk’s recommendation much, if at all.”). 
 157. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: De-
ciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 329-42 
(2009); see also PERRY, supra note 10, at 271-82 (following in-depth interviews and qualita-
tive empirical analysis, explaining the Justices’ decisionmaking processes, not the law 
clerks’); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: 
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 
391 (2004) (finding that “[a]lthough the Justices consider the very same cases and materials, 
in light of the same criteria set out in the Court’s rule, they come to quite different conclu-
sions about which cases merit plenary review [and that e]ven Justices closely aligned in deci-
sions on the merits often have dramatically different voting records on certiorari”). 
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thing special about these cases and therefore give them particular at-
tention, belying concerns about undue reliance on the pool memo. 
There may of course be important, sui generis cases that have been 
denied by the Court and that arguably should have been heard (al-
though neither book identifies any), but given the likelihood that 
such cases are carefully considered, blaming such denials on the  
existence of the cert pool or on undue law clerk influence is, in my 
view, mistaken. 
 A second category of cases that might fall through the cracks of 
the pool are those dealing with subjects of particular interest to par-
ticular Justices, since they cannot direct other Justices’ law clerks to 
look out for them. For example, Justice Powell took special care when 
reviewing capital cases.158 Justice Marshall wanted heightened re-
view of cert petitions involving civil rights.159 Other Justices might 
seek out cases implicating, for example, federalism issues. But it is 
not difficult for a Justice to instruct his own clerks to pull such pool 
memos or petitions for particular scrutiny or to select those memos 
himself. In fact, this is just what Justice Powell did.160 Because the 
Justices can identify those areas of law or legal issues to which they 
want particular attention paid, they and their law clerks can counte-
ract any short shrift that a pool author from another chamber might 
give. 
 A third and related danger discussed in both books is partisanship 
in the pool memos. Justice Blackmun complained that some law 
clerks failed to include a mention of a dissent or information about 
the judges on the appellate court panel in their pool memos,161 from 
which Ward and Weiden seem to infer that he believed that some law 
clerks purposely omitted this information to make a grant less likely. 
Similarly, one of Justice Kennedy’s former clerks recalled that a lib-
eral clerk shaded the facts in a pool memo to make his desired result 
more likely.162 Obviously, shading or omitting key information or 
                                                                                                                    
 158. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 126-27, 192-93. 
 159. PERRY, supra note 10, at 261-63 (listing subjects that were of particular interest to 
each Justice). 
 160. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 126-27. Justice Douglas, who was not a member of 
the cert pool, nonetheless relied on his law clerks to review the cert petitions and in-
structed them to identify petitions on subjects of interest. Id. at 119-21. See also PERRY,
supra note 10, at 61 (noting that when clerks review pool memos for their Justices, they of-
ten identify and flag subjects about which they know their Justices are interested). 
 161. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 133-34. 
 162. COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 202-203. In an even more disturbing story, Eduardo 
Penalver, a former Stevens clerk describes “one death row petition [] for which a clerk for a 
conservative Justice recommended ‘deny’ without any explanation at all.” Posting of 
Eduardo Penalver to Think Progress, http://thinkprogress.org (Aug. 2, 2005) (Think 
Progress set up a short term Supreme Court site during the nominations of Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito, but the site has been disabled and the posts deleted; hard copy is 
on file with author.). But the fact that Penalver mentioned this breach means that it did 
not go unnoticed. Moreover, the norms and culture of the cert pool work against this kind 
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facts in a pool memo to reach the law clerk’s desired result impedes 
the Justices from exercising their own judgment. And clerks may 
sometimes recommend “defensive” denials when they are fearful that 
the result on the merits would not be to their liking.163
 But the bureaucratic nature of the cert pool means that there are 
safeguards.164 There are standards for pool memos—such as includ-
ing the information Justice Blackmun identified.165 In addition, the 
memos are not anonymous,166 and most Justices have their law clerks 
review at least some of the cert memos written by law clerks from 
other chambers.167 A law clerk can develop a reputation for reliability 
or lack thereof (whether because she is ideologically driven or be-
cause she is simply sloppy) among her peers in other chambers or 
even among the Justices themselves.168 Doing shoddy or unreliable 
work is deeply embarrassing to one’s Justice as well as to the law 
clerk herself.169 As a result, there is a culture in which law clerks 
take their cert pool responsibilities very seriously.170 If anything, pool 
memos are longer and more comprehensive than the memos law 
clerks used to write for their individual Justices.171 And of course 
both Justices and law clerks alike can identify certain “hot button” 
issues that are likely to lead a clerk to allow bias—conscious or un-
conscious—to affect her analysis. Areas of law like capital punish-
ment, voting rights, abortion rights, and the Establishment Clause, 
for example, are their own red flags to Justices and clerks who review 
the pool memos.172
                                                                                                                    
of behavior. Former Ginsburg clerk David Franklin, responding to Penalver’s post, noted 
that, “when I was clerking, if any clerk had ever given short shrift to a pool memo in a 
death case because he was ‘swamped with other work at the time,’ it would have been con-
sidered a serious lapse of professionalism at the very least.” See id.
 163. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 133 n.96 (quoting JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE,
COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 17(2001)). 
 164. In Peppers’ terms, these safeguards replace the more intimate control of the law 
clerk available when the clerk is writing only for her own Justice. COURTIERS, supra note 
1, at 210. Less intimate does not necessarily mean less effective, however. Pool memo au-
thors today know that at least six other people (some law clerks, some Justices) will be re-
viewing their work—and they do not generally even know which six people it will be. Writ-
ing a deliberately manipulative or misleading pool memo is undoubtedly more difficult 
(and hence much riskier) for six unknown readers than for one known principal. Id. 
 165. PERRY, supra note 10, at 42. 
 166. Id. at 57. 
 167. Id. at 54-55, 60-64. 
 168. See, e.g., SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 136. 
 169. Id. at 128 (“[P]roducing written work that brings disrepute upon themselves and 
their chambers is little less than a heart-stopping prospect.”) (quoting former Blackmun 
clerk Dan Coenen); see also PERRY, supra note 10, at 56-57, 64. 
 170. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 128-29. 
 171. Id. at 129-31; see also PERRY, supra note 10, at 52-53, 55. 
 172. See, e.g., Penalver, supra note 162 (arguing that “it mattered a great deal which 
case wound up with which clerk,” in part because different subjects were likely to appeal to 
liberals or to conservatives). 
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 Despite their concern for too much clerk influence, Ward and Wei-
den also highlight an interesting counterdanger—a lack of partisan-
ship. As they put it, the pool removes candor from cert review.173
Comparing memos drafted for particular Justices with pool memos, 
they conclude that “clerks who wrote only for their own [J]ustice 
were more candid in the past, particularly with recommendations 
and political analyses, than are current clerks who write one memo 
for eight [now seven] [J]ustices who occupy different positions on the 
ideological spectrum.”174 And they offer a fascinating example: by 
chance, one of Justice Blackmun’s clerks was assigned the pool memo 
for Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, an important abortion 
case. In the memo, the law clerk wrote: “The seventh question pre-
sented is whether the Court should reconsider Roe v. Wade. It is not 
necessary to reconsider Roe in order to decide the other issues pre-
sented. However, should the Court wish to revisit that opinion this 
case is an adequate vehicle for doing so.”175 For Justice Blackmun 
himself, however, the law clerk was much more candid. In a 
handwritten note, he added: “(not that I think my recommendation 
counts for very much in this case.) I hope I have not taken objectivity 
too far.”176
 As this example illustrates, there is a safeguard against bland and 
bureaucratic pool memos: “The decline of candid analyses in pool 
memos is no doubt one reason why [J]ustices ask their own clerks to 
mark up the pool memo and do further research if a pool memo pi-
ques their interest.”177 And indeed, Sorcerers cites numerous exam-
ples of law clerks adding their own candid and even irreverent com-
ments to the pool memos they reviewed.178 The result of the cert pool 
coupled with individual law clerk markups of pool memos may there-
fore be the best of both worlds—a relatively neutral (bland) evalua-
tion of whether a case meets the Court’s criteria for granting cert and 
an individualized review by the Justices’ own clerks. 
 Although most of the concerns about whether law clerks are undu-
ly influential or unduly partisan in carrying out their cert duties 
cannot withstand critical scrutiny, the persistence and widespread 
acceptance of these concerns is damaging to the Court’s institutional 
credibility and stature. The question, then, is whether and how the 
                                                                                                                    
 173. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 128-31. 
 174. Id. at 129; see also id. at 127 (“When a clerk writes for an individual justice, he or 
she can be more candid.”) (quoting Justice Stevens); PERRY, supra note 10, at 59 (noting 
that pool memos do not allow much opportunity for ideological discussion). 
 175. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 130. 
 176. Id.
 177. Id. at 131; see also PERRY, supra note 10, at 56 (noting that the markup, “not the 
pool memo, was seen as the place to communicate with one’s boss—particularly for more 
strategic considerations”). 
 178. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 10-32, 130. 
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Court can address them. I believe that almost all of these concerns 
about the cert pool could be alleviated were the Supreme Court to (1) 
publicly share more information about the reasons it does or does not 
grant cert in particular cases and (2) reevaluate—and likely 
change—its cert criteria and the culture of the cert pool. 
 Except in the rarest of cases, there is no explanation for why the 
Court denies cert in a particular case. Lawyers and court observers 
generally have no way to know if a case has even been seriously con-
sidered by being placed on the discuss list.179 And although the Court 
sometimes provides an explanation of its cert grant in merits opi-
nions, those explanations are generally so minimal that they provide 
little or no useful guidance for the future.180
 Yet consider the advantages of more transparency in the cert 
process. Lawyers might gain more information about some of the rea-
sons the Court chooses not to grant cases. This in turn is likely to 
lead to better-written cert petitions and even possibly fewer cert peti-
tions181—saving resources for litigants and the Court alike.182 At the 
same time, an understanding that, in general, the role of the cert pool 
is relatively bureaucratic, not partisan or ideological, might decrease 
the concerns about who is really making the decisions. In addition, 
the process of deciding what information to reveal and how to reveal 
it might lead the Justices to reevaluate the cert criteria and the cul-
ture of the cert pool, both of which tilt against grant recommenda-
tions. In other words, more transparency about cert decisions would 
encourage both public and internal discussion to focus more on the 
cert criteria themselves—which I have argued elsewhere are too nar-
row183—rather than on the less important question of how the cert 
pool works.184
                                                                                                                    
 179. An exception is when a case is relisted. Occasionally, the Court does not resolve a 
particular cert petition during its weekly conference. This can happen for a variety of rea-
sons, including a Justice wanting to review the petition or pool memo again. See PERRY,
supra note 10, at 49-51 (discussing reasons for relisting a case). Because cases that do not 
make the discuss list are rarely relisted (at least absent some other action of the Court, 
such as ordering a response to the original petition), even if a relisted case is eventually 
denied without explanation, knowledgeable court-watchers can infer that the case was of 
interest to at least one Justice. 
 180. See id. at 34 (quoting Stern and Gressman). 
 181. But see id. at 224-25 (noting that there are often litigation advantages to filing 
cert petitions that have no hope of being granted). 
 182. I am not the first to intimate that the Court itself might benefit from less secrecy 
in the cert process. In Deciding to Decide, Perry points out the irony that the Justices  of-
ten complain about the large number of clearly (to them) non-certworthy petitions that are 
filed, yet fail to provide the public and the bar with sufficient information to allow lawyers 
to make well-informed judgments about whether it is worthwhile to file a petition. PERRY,
supra note 10, at 34-35. 
 183. Shapiro, supra note 113, at 275. 
184. The Court’s reluctance to reveal information about the cert process and criteria 
has another, somewhat less visible effect that should, I believe, give rise to some concerns 
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 As always, of course, the devil is in the details. There are good 
reasons why the deliberations of the Justices do not become public, 
and my proposal is definitely reminiscent of revealing deliberations. 
Likewise, making public aspects of the Court’s workings might well 
cause substantive changes to them. If, for example, as Ward and 
Weiden propose, cert petitions were made public, law clerks would 
write them with that broader audience in mind, eliminating what 
candor the cert pool allows.185 If instead the discuss list were made 
public, Justices might become very strategic about what they put on 
the list. But of course there is no reason why the Court must release 
information in the form it creates internally. For example, the Court 
could identify cases that present issues that are possibly certworthy 
but that were denied due to jurisdictional or other vehicle problems. 
Texas v. Hopwood186 provides one possible model. In Hopwood, the 
Fifth Circuit held unconstitutional the University of Texas’ race-
based affirmative action program.187 The case, although extraordina-
rily important and closely watched, was moot by the time it got to the 
Supreme Court, which denied cert.188 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Jus-
tice Souter, wrote an opinion respecting the denial of cert that ex-
                                                                                                                    
about the Court’s democratic accountability. The secrecy—when combined with the strict 
rules about law clerk confidentiality—creates a two-tiered system where litigants who have 
access to former Supreme Court law clerks are at a significant advantage in seeking (or 
opposing) cert. I come to this view in part through my personal experience working with 
and advising practitioners about seeking or opposing certiorari. In my experience, many 
excellent lawyers with many years of litigation experience know little about how best to 
present their cases to the Court. They are likely to overemphasize the facts of their case 
because they often assume that the Court is looking for unique or unusual cases, or they 
think that if they can demonstrate injustice to their client, cert is more likely to be granted. 
These assumptions are wrong. Lawyers opposing certiorari assume that they should file a 
brief in opposition—often spending significant time and money on it—rather than simply 
waiving their response and waiting to see if the Court orders one. Supreme Court Rule 10 
contains cert criteria, but they are highly discretionary and too general to provide much 
guidance. See Shapiro, supra note 113, at 284 n.50; Cordray & Cordray, The Philosophy of 
Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, supra note 
157, at 400-01. There are of course resources, most notably Gressman’s Supreme Court 
Practice, that provide advice and information on all of these points. But these are not ade-
quate substitutes for personal knowledge and experience. 
 Moreover, the rigid views on law clerk confidentiality mean that a former Supreme 
Court law clerk may not, for example, publicly share information about what cases were 
placed on the discuss list but not granted, about the reasons the law clerk believes that 
particular cases were not granted, or about the types of issues that the law clerk knows are 
of interest to particular justices. On the other hand, that same former law clerk might well 
make use of this information on behalf of a client, even if only sub silentio. As a result, liti-
gants who have access to former Supreme Court law clerks are at a significant advantage 
over other litigants. Thus an additional benefit of increased transparency would be a more 
equitable distribution of information among litigants. 
 185. For this reason, I do not support this suggestion. 
 186. 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
 187. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 188. Hopwood, 518 U.S. at 2581-82. 
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plained why the mootness of the case rendered cert inappropriate.189
There is no reason not to have more such explanations. In fact, pro-
viding them more often and in less hot-button cases is likely to make 
them more widely accepted at face value instead of being seen as a 
signal about how the Court ultimately will rule.190 Another possibility 
is an annual “cert report,” in which the Court could provide informa-
tion about different cases or categories of denied cases that it consi-
dered potentially certworthy and those that it did not. 
 To find the best way to share more information with the public, 
the Court should be willing to experiment. It could try one approach 
for a single Term and then assess whether or not it worked—which is 
what the Court did when it created the cert pool. Other efforts to in-
crease transparency have been successful. Until recently, the Court 
did not release audio of its oral arguments. Until even more recently, 
its oral argument transcripts did not identify which Justices asked 
which questions. Even the names of law clerks were not, at one time, 
routinely made public.191 Providing this information to the public 
does not seem to have affected the workings of the Court one way or 
another. The Court should not fear relatively minimal transparency 
about how it does its work.192
 None of this discussion is intended to suggest that the cert pool is 
without its flaws. But those flaws are more subtle than the common 
critiques of partisanship and undue law clerk influence suggest, and 
they have at least as much to do with the cert criteria as with the 
practice of relying on law clerks to review the petitions. A first con-
cern is that, just as law clerk recommendations are of minimal use in 
the hot-button cases, that “influence is likely to be greatest where the 
[J]ustice does not have a strong preference.”193 As a result, it is cases 
that involve important but unsexy issues that are most likely to be 
given short shrift. Some argue that commercial law cases are under-
represented among the Court’s merits decisions for this very rea-
son.194 In general, however, the concern about law clerk influence is 
                                                                                                                    
 189. Id.
 190. Some saw Justice Ginsburg’s Hopwood opinion as a signal that she and Justice 
Souter believed the Fifth Circuit was wrong. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline Affirma-
tive-Action Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1996, at A12 (stating that “Justice Ginsburg appeared 
to be using her separate opinion as a way of advising the public not to interpret the Court’s 
refusal to hear the case as an endorsement of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis”); Rogers Wor-
thington & Sabrina Miller, Cloudy Day for Affirmative Action in Colleges; Courts Won’t 
Hear Case; Issue Still in Limbo, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1996, at 3 (stating that Justice Gins-
burg’s brief opinion “[left] the door open for considering another case that would test  
the issues”). 
 191. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 18. 
 192. See PERRY, supra note 10, at 46 (arguing that revealing the voting order at the 
Justices’ Conference is entirely innocuous). 
 193. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 128. 
 194. Id. at 144 (citing Kenneth Starr and Judge Richard Posner). 
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tied to undue partisanship, and such partisanship is less likely to be 
an issue for these less politically salient cases. Instead, if the Justices 
agree that commercial law is underrepresented on their docket, they 
can adjust the cert criteria accordingly. 
 Second, the cert pool has the effect of ossifying its own criteria. 
Law clerks prefer to recommend grants only when they know that 
their recommendations are readily defensible. They seek objectively 
verifiable criteria like circuit splits and are unlikely to recommend a 
grant based on a belief, for example, that the lower court was simply 
wrong.195 Certain issues may be institutionally disfavored. For exam-
ple, at the onset of the cert pool, one of Justice Blackmun’s clerks 
wrote a memo entitled “Recurring Issues in Cert Petitions,” listing a 
series of issues, such as constitutional challenges to “California inde-
terminate sentencing” and the scope or interstices of Miranda, that 
the Court was “not eager to review.”196 Law clerks receiving such a 
memo are unlikely to recommend a grant in a case presenting such 
an issue, even if they believe that there are good reasons for the 
Court to change course.  
 A third and related point, supported by recent empirical evidence, 
is that the bureaucracy and culture of the cert pool lead law clerks to 
be unduly stingy with their certiorari grant recommendations.197 As I 
have detailed elsewhere, law clerks tend to review cert petitions with 
a checklist of reasons to deny, not with the goal of finding cases to 
recommend granting.198 It is considered very embarrassing for a law 
clerk if the Court acts on her grant recommendation but the case lat-
er needs to be dismissed or is otherwise problematic for reasons that 
the law clerk should have foreseen. On the other hand, there is rarely 
any downside, from the law clerk’s perspective, to recommending a 
denial.199 Again, this is an issue of the cert pool culture and underly-
ing cert criteria. 
 Finally, the cert pool combined with stingy and ossified cert crite-
ria has the effect of insulating the Justices from what is happening in 
the lower courts. When the Justices read few if any cert petitions, or 
when they fail to read at least a representative sample, they are 
much less likely to notice recurring issues or themes, to pick up on 
areas of law that appear to be chaotic or unpredictable, or to consider 
whether the Court’s decisions about particular issues or the general 
                                                                                                                    
 195. Id. at 133; see also Stras, supra note 115, at 972-76. 
 196. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 119. 
 197. PERRY, supra note 10, at 64; Stras, supra note 115, at 989. 
 198. Shapiro, supra note 113, at 285; see also PERRY, supra note 10, at 218-20. 
 199. PERRY, supra note 10, at 220-21 (quoting Justices and clerks talking about the li-
kelihood that a “case [issue] will come back” if it is important); SORCERERS, supra note 2, 
at 144 (quoting Justice Stevens). 
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cert criteria themselves should be revisited.200 They are even more in-
sulated if they do not even read most pool memos themselves. As I 
have argued elsewhere, this distance from the nitty-gritty of law as 
experienced and practiced in the courts on a regular basis can lead 
the Justices to ignore areas of law that may be in desperate need of 
guidance and clarity, particularly areas of law involving the applica-
tion of general standards in fact-intensive contexts.201 If such areas of 
law do not fit neatly into a preexisting certiorari category such as a 
clean circuit split, they are relatively unlikely to ever pierce a Jus-
tice’s consciousness.202 Again, however, this problem can be addressed 
in a variety of ways, from loosening cert criteria to more communica-
tion with lower court judges to the Justices reviewing more cert  
memos themselves. 
 At bottom, then, while the cert pool and cert criteria may indeed 
merit reform—and while such reforms might well lead to a higher 
grant rate—nothing about the cert pool itself is either particularly 
new or intrinsically dangerous or irresponsible. Law clerks have long 
been involved in reviewing cert petitions. Concerns that law clerks 
have too much power or influence in the cert process do not, for the 
most part, withstand critical examination. To a large extent, the 
Court could resolve the concerns about the cert pool both by provid-
ing more transparency in the cert process and by revisiting its cert 
criteria and instructions to the law clerks.203
                                                                                                                    
 200. This may be one reason why the cert pool might need to be restructured if future 
Justices, including Justice Stevens’ eventual replacement, choose to join it (especially if 
Justice Alito rejoins). Having two parallel pools or having each petition assigned to two 
chambers rather than one would provide some safeguard against having law clerks miss 
something. See SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 148-49 (describing concerns and suggestions 
raised by the Justices regarding the operation of the cert pool). 
 201. Shapiro, supra note 113, at 286. 
 202. Id. 
 203. One additional criticism leveled by Ward and Weiden, Judge Posner, and others is 
that the Justices should not delegate the drafting of opinions to their law clerks. See, e.g., 
Garrow, supra note 3, at 419-20. And indeed, there may be instances in which law clerks 
have written opinions with inappropriately little guidance or oversight, id. at 414, or have 
been able to “introduce language or develop legal reasoning that is not entirely consistent 
with the [J]ustices’ positions.” Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Ghostwriters on the Court?: A Sty-
listic Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 173 (2002). 
There is no question that a Justice should maintain tight control over the final product. I 
do not believe, however, that for every judge or Justice, this control requires drafting the 
opinion herself. Different cognitive styles lend themselves to different control mechanisms. 
See, e.g., Kermit Lipez, Judges and Their Law Clerks: Some Reflections, 22 MAINE BAR J. 
112 (Spring 2007) (describing Judge Lipez’s interactive opinion-writing process). And just 
as with pool memos, there are many other people monitoring the content of the opinions. 
Perhaps most interesting, however, this criticism about opinion writing is often couched in 
terms of ideology. Garrow, supra note 3, at 419. See infra, Section II.B. 
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B. The Second Proxy War: The Role of Ideology on the Supreme 
Court 
 The cert process is not the only aspect of the Supreme Court that 
operates in secrecy. To the contrary, except for the release of its final 
work product—the opinions—and the questions that the Justices ask 
at oral argument, the Court operates in total secrecy. The Court’s de-
liberations are strictly confidential not only while cases are pending, 
but also long after they have been released. In fact, some Justices 
were reportedly quite displeased about the posthumous release of 
Justices Blackmun’s and Marshall’s papers, as those papers included 
information about relatively recent cases and about Justices still 
serving on the Court.204
 Supreme Court law clerks are charged with helping to maintain 
this confidentiality. They are supposed to place confidential papers in 
burn bags instead of in the regular trash or recycling.205 They are 
strictly prohibited from talking to the press.206 The ethical canons 
that have applied to Supreme Court law clerks since 1998 are expli-
cit; clerks owe a duty of confidentiality both to their own Justices and 
to the Court as an institution, and those obligations continue even af-
ter they leave their clerkships.207
 Despite these strict admonitions of confidentiality, former law 
clerks do periodically reveal information about the workings of the 
Court—often to loud condemnation. But the nature of that condem-
nation is revealing. The howls of outrage are loudest when the disclo-
sures describe the Court as politically and ideologically driven and 
divided, such as after publication of The Brethren in 1979.  
                                                                                                                    
 204. The National Law Journal, Are Justices Right to be Miffed About Papers? 15 NAT’L
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Supreme Court and the Brethren, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 303, 303-05 (2001). Justice 
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Margolick, Meet the Supremes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007 (reviewing JEFFREY TOOBIN,
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007)) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/books/review/Margolick-t.html. For Deciding to Decide,
Perry’s book-length analysis of the cert process, the author interviewed five Justices. 
PERRY, supra note 10, at 9. 
 205. SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 11. 
 206. Tony Mauro, Summer Subpoenas Lead to Fall Chill, 28 NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 8 
(2004) (describing the rumored 90-second rule under Chief Justice Warren Burger: “any 
law clerk seen talking to a journalist for more than 90 seconds would be fired”). 
 207. See David Lane, Bush v. Gore, Vanity Fair, and a Supreme Court Law Clerk’s Du-
ty of Confidentiality, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 872, 877-79 (2005). The earlier version 
of the canons, effective in 1989, was somewhat less clear but arguably imposed on-going 
duties on former claw clerks. Id. at 871. In part because of these ethical obligations, as the 
authors of both Courtiers and Sorcerers complain, doing research on law clerks is not easy. 
See COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 18-20; SORCERERS, supra note 2, at 10. Many former law 
clerks simply refuse to participate in any research project. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 10, 
at 10. 
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The fallout over the book was immediate and fierce. It was evident 
that former clerks had talked to Woodward and Armstrong, and 
Court insiders bemoaned the breach of the duty of confidentiality 
owed by clerk to [J]ustice and the casting of the Supreme Court as 
a politically polarized body. The [J]ustices themselves were 
shocked at the amount of confidential information leaked in the 
book, and incoming law clerks were warned of the dire conse-
quences of any future leaks.208
 A similar reaction followed the 1998 publication of Closed Cham-
bers by Edward Lazarus, who described an ideologically divided 
Court in which the swing Justices were manipulated by a “cabal” of 
conservative law clerk ideologues.209 Lazarus, a former Blackmun 
clerk, was viciously condemned in print in numerous law reviews, 
perhaps most notably by Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit.210 And 
similar, often vitriolic, condemnations were made when a group of 
law clerks for the four dissenting Justices in Bush v. Gore shared in-
formation about what happened during that case with a Vanity Fair 
reporter.211 In contrast, however, I can find no evidence of dismay 
about violations of confidentiality following publication of Deciding to 
Decide—a serious scholarly work that focused on how the cert process 
worked as a practical and largely nonideological matter and relied in 
part on interviews with sixty-four former Supreme Court law 
clerks212—or, for that matter, of Sorcerers and Courtiers themselves, 
in which, by and large, former law clerks disavow any political or 
ideological influence and report virtually no outcome-oriented ideo-
logical voting by the Justices. 
 The outrage over law clerk disclosures primarily when they de-
scribe ideological behavior by the Justices or undue ideological influ-
ence by the law clerks is a significant tell. It suggests that the con-
cern is not about confidentiality per se. Rather, there is particular 
anxiety about revelations that (accurately or otherwise) depict the 
Court as a highly political and ideological institution. Condemnations 
of these kinds of revelations are sometimes coupled with condemna-
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tions of other disclosures that paint the Court or particular Justices 
in unflattering light. In his attack on Closed Chambers, for example, 
Judge Kozinski complains at length about Lazarus’s depiction of the 
Court as driven by ideology and the law clerks as willing and able to 
“exercise ‘sometimes inappropriate influence over the law.’ ”213 He al-
so excoriates Lazarus for violating  
the bond of loyalty to his Justice, the other Justices, and his fellow 
clerks. . . . [I]t was clearly understood that, under normal circums-
tances, whatever one learned inside the Court—whether or not it 
was covered by the duty of confidentiality—would not be repeated 
on the outside, especially if it tended to demean the Court, the Jus-
tices, or fellow clerks.214
The inference is irresistible: the depiction of an ideological and di-
vided Court is demeaning or, at a minimum, discomforting. If true, it 
is better left unsaid. 
 It is also significant that concern about law clerks influence is not 
equally distributed. No one is especially concerned that, say, Justice 
Scalia or Justice Ginsburg are unduly influenced by their clerks. To 
the contrary, these Justices have strong views and distinctive voices. 
While observers may disagree—even vehemently—with one or the 
other of them, that disagreement is primarily attributed to the Jus-
tices themselves. It is the swing Justices—notably Kennedy and 
O’Connor—about whom there is the most concern that they have 
been unduly influenced by the people who work for them.215
 This unevenly distributed outrage and concern are not, therefore, 
about apparent violations of the law clerks’ Code of Ethics. Rather, 
the anxiety arises largely in response to an acknowledgment of the 
often political, sometimes ideological, nature of the Court. In particu-
lar, this acknowledgment flies in the face of a frequently articulated 
view that the work of the Court is not, or should not be, ideological; 
                                                                                                                    
 213. Kozinski, supra note 210, at 866 (quoting LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 516). 
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O’Connor, where the law clerks were intoxicated by the enormous power of the swing vote.” 
COURTIERS, supra note 1, at 10 (citing LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 274). Lazarus wrote that 
both Justices were “susceptible to clerks’ arguments and delegate to them almost all the 
opinion drafting and doctrine crunching . . . .” LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 274. Conserva-
tives unhappy with and liberals hailing Justice Kennedy’s vote in Casey or Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), are tempted to attribute them, at least in part, to his law  
clerks. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Scott McLellan (Blog Post), http://michaeldorf.org/ 
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that it can and should be limited to the neutral application of neutral 
sources and principles. In his confirmation hearings, for example, 
Chief Justice Roberts famously described the role of a Supreme Court 
Justice as one of an umpire who neutrally “call[s] balls and 
strikes,”216 and more recently Justice Sotomayor, in her own confir-
mation hearings, insisted that all of a Justice’s decisions should be 
dictated by only the law and the facts of the case.217 This view is also 
reflected, or at least nourished, by politicians’ and commentators’ 
complaints about “activist judges” and by periodic expressions of 
dismay about the contentiousness of confirmation hearings and their 
focus on nominees’ ideology rather than exclusively on their qualifi-
cations, intelligence, and competence.218 In fact, there is an emerging 
norm that nominees to the Supreme Court are not asked—and  
certainly do not answer—questions about their views on any issue  
of public importance that might come before, or might already  
have come before, the Court, helping to maintain the public fiction  
of neutrality.219
 Yet the Supreme Court is a highly political institution.220 Whether 
or not consistent with the Framers’ intent, today, for better or for 
worse, the Supreme Court addresses many of the country’s most con-
tentious issues, such as abortion, affirmative action, and the death 
penalty. It decided a case allowing Presidents to be sued while in of-
fice221 and, in perhaps its most famous and most political decision ev-
er, it determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential election.222 And 
not only is the Court engaged in these high profile issues and cases, 
but such cases rarely have straightforward, neutral answers. In other 
words, as Judge Posner puts it, Supreme Court cases, by their nature, 
give the Justices a lot of room for discretion and political judgment.223
                                                                                                                    
 216. Nomination of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court: Panel One of a Hearing of the S. JUDICIARY COMM., 104th Cong. (Sept. 12, 2005) 
(statement of Judge John Roberts); PERRY, supra note 10, at 140-42 (noting the unrealistic 
view that the work of the Court is or should be neutral and objective). 
 217. Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Panel I of a Hearing Before the S. JUDICIARY COMM., 106th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of Judge Sonia Sotomayor). 
 218. Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dissent: The Fight Over the President’s Judicial Nomi-
nations, THE NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003.  
 219. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Role of Ideology in Confirming Federal Court Judges, 15
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 127, 129-31 (2002). 
 220. In his recent book, Judge Posner calls it a “political court.” POSNER, supra note 9, 
at 8. An influential body of work in political science posits that the Justices’ votes can best 
be explained simply by their desire to implement their policy preferences. See, e.g., 
HAROLD SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). For a 
more detailed analysis of the role of ideology in the work of the Supreme Court, see gener-
ally Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholar-
ship, 75 Missouri L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2010). 
 221. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 222. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 223. POSNER, supra note 9, at 8, 28. 
134 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:101 
 Obviously, the inherently political nature of the Supreme Court is 
at odds with the image of the neutral umpire. Hence, when the Jus-
tices decide cases in ways that appear ideologically driven, there is a 
disconnect between what many in the public expect and what they 
observe. Even more problematic is that people tend (or claim) to be-
lieve that the Justices they agree with are engaging in neutral judg-
ing, while those they disagree with are being ideological. Thus, when 
conservatives hail “strict constructionist” judges and condemn “activ-
ist judges,” they imply that the strict constructionists (conservatives) 
are simply applying the words of the Constitution or statutes, while 
the activists (liberals) are imposing their own personal views on the 
country. Yet, if a measure of judicial activism is a willingness to 
strike down federal statutes as unconstitutional, the Rehnquist 
Court’s conservatives were much more “activist” than were its liber-
als.224 And although liberals complain bitterly about the Roberts 
Court’s disregard of the “neutral” principle of stare decisis,225 they 
cheered when the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.226
 So what we have is a highly political institution making important 
decisions about important and highly salient issues. Yet it is an insti-
tution shrouded in secrecy and about which there is this fiction of 
neutrality—a fiction that everyone can see is inaccurate. It is, there-
fore, natural for people to want to understand how the Court oper-
ates and how the Justices reach their decisions. It is in this context 
that the fascination with law clerks begins to make more sense: the 
fascination is less with law clerks themselves, but rather with the 
workings of the Court. Law clerks are the thin edge of the wedge; if we 
know what they do and how much influence they wield, then maybe 
we can understand what is really going on at One First Avenue.227
 But just as obsession with law clerks’ role in the cert process ob-
scures more substantive questions about the Court’s criteria for 
granting cert, focusing our concern about law clerks’ ideological in-
fluence masks other important questions. Specifically, there are diffi-
cult questions about the appropriate balance between judicial inde-
pendence and democratic accountability in our constitutional Court, 
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about the proper role of ideology in the work of the Court, and even 
about the appropriate levels of secrecy and candor for such an impor-
tant political institution in a democracy. I will call these questions, 
and the ambivalence and apprehension with which they are often ad-
dressed, “democratic anxiety.” 
 Democratic anxiety is not usually addressed forthrightly, and 
compared to the concerns about the cert process, the issues here are 
both less technical and more complex. Working through these issues 
completely is beyond the scope of this Article, and I do not pretend to 
know what the right answers are. I believe, however, that more 
forthrightness by and about the Justices, while not likely to eliminate 
this democratic anxiety completely, might at least alleviate it. In par-
ticular, we should be more honest about what Supreme Court Justic-
es do—that the Court is to a large degree a political body and the 
Justices’ decisions and opinions are often, although not always, co-
lored by their ideological and other perspectives.228 Of course, there 
are public acknowledgments of these realities already, but they are 
often (usually) couched in terms that suggest that political decision-
making by the Court is improper.  
 Increased candor of course has significant implications. In particu-
lar, it raises the partisan stakes in already contentious confirmation 
hearings. Indeed, if we admit that Supreme Court Justices are en-
gaged in political activity, then that single democratic moment—
Senate confirmation—will and should become that much more crucial 
for their legitimacy. Likewise, acknowledging the political nature of 
the Court may ultimately make more attractive proposals to limit 
service by Supreme Court Justices to eighteen years with rotating 
appointments every two years.229
 As I have said, determining the best way to acknowledge, under-
stand, and address the role of ideology in Supreme Court judging is 
beyond the scope of this Article. The point here, rather, is that the 
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concern lavished on inappropriate and ideological law clerk influence 
masks this deeper democratic anxiety and threatens the long term 
legitimacy of the Court. It is this anxiety that must be addressed. 
III.   CONCLUSION
 Sorcerers and Courtiers add fascinating and previously unknown 
information to our knowledge of the Supreme Court. While Courtiers
is at times overwhelming in its detail, its precision and thoroughness 
will serve scholars well for many years to come. Sorcerers’ insights 
into the sometimes unforeseen or unintended consequences of 
changes in the Court’s internal operations likewise shed needed light 
behind the red curtain. 
 Despite these books’ contributions, it would be a mistake to over-
look the reasons for the authors—and our—interest in the subject. It 
is not that law clerks are intrinsically so fascinating; it is that the 
Court, in its current operations, is too secretive, leading to legitimate 
but unwarranted concerns about the cert process and to democratic 
anxiety about the political nature of Supreme Court judging. The 
Justices should take these concerns seriously. Where there are easy 
fixes, as in the cert process, they should take them; where experi-
mentation might be warranted, they should embrace it. And where 
the nature of a constitutional court in our democracy is at issue, they 
should be willing to engage in a real dialogue with practitioners, aca-
demics, and the people. 
